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On a per capita basis, Canadian drug costs are already the second highest in the world after the United States and
are among the fastest rising in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. The Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the European Union (EU) and Canada will further exacerbate the
rise in costs by:
 Committing Canada to creating a new system of patent term restoration thereby delaying entry of generic
medicines by up to two years;
 Locking in Canada’s current term of data protection, and creating barriers for future governments wanting to
reverse it;
 Implementing a new right of appeal under the patent linkage system that will create further delays for the
entry of generics.
CETA will only affect intellectual property rights in Canada—not the EU. This analysis estimates that CETA’s
provisions will increase Canadian drug costs by between 6.2% and 12.9% starting in 2023. The Canadian
government committed to compensating provinces for the rise in costs for their public drug plans. Importantly, this
means that people paying out-of-pocket for their drugs or receiving them through private insurance, will be
charged twice: once through higher drug costs and once more through their federal taxes.
As drug costs continue to grow, there are limited options available for provincial/territorial governments: restrict the
choice of medicines in public drug plans; transfer costs to patients who typically are either elderly or sick; or take
money from other places in the health system, and threaten the viability of Canada’s single payer system. CETA will
therefore negatively impact the ability of Canada to offer quality health care.
Keywords: Brand-name drugs, Canada, CETA, Data protection, European Union, Intellectual Property rights,
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European Union were launched in May 2009. In October
2013, the negotiating parties announced they had
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article, unless otherwise stated.its implementation should begin in 2015. One of the
most controversial issues about CETA is its proposal to
extend intellectual property protection for patented
drugs in Canada, which could significantly increase drug
costs for Canadians. We recognize that trade deals are
complex and involve trade-offs for other benefits that
countries hope to obtain. In this article we are not
attempting to weigh the overall benefits and costs to
Canada of CETA, rather we are just focusing on the im-
pact that CETA will have on expenditures for patented
prescription drugs.Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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power parity), Canada spends more per capita on phar-
maceuticals than any other country in the world except
the United States (US) [1]. Similarly when measured
against comparator countries in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Canada’s
growth in drug spending per capita (in real terms) be-
tween 2000 to 2009 was 4.3 percent per year compared to
the OECD average of 3.5 percent. Although this rate fell
to −0.3 percent per year from 2009–2011, the OECD aver-
age fell to −0.9 percent [1]. Canada represented 2.6% of
the global market sales in prescription drugs in 2011,
while the United Kingdom, with a population almost twice
as large, made up only 2.5% of the global market [2]. In
2012 Canada was spending almost as much on pre-
scription drugs at $27.73 billion as it was on physi-
cians at $29.96 billion [3].
Compared to other health expenditures, from 1985 to
2006, Canadian drug spending consistently grew at a fas-
ter rate than overall health spending [4]. There were a
number of cost drivers, including population growth and
aging, general inflation, price effects (the cost of pur-
chasing an individual drug), volume effects (number and
size of prescriptions) and mix effects (changes in the
drugs selected to treat a particular condition). Although
population growth and aging are often cited as major
reasons for spending increases, in fact the second largest
contributor, after volume effects, was mix effects, i.e.,
substituting newer, more expensive drugs for older, less
expensive ones [5]. While using more expensive drugs is
justified when they are therapeutically superior, overall
fewer than 1 in 10 new drugs offer any significant thera-
peutic advantages [6].
Since 2007, the growth in drug spending has slowed
and in 2011 and 2012 was 3.8% and 3.2%, respectively
[7]. The trend to slower growth is arguably due to a com-
bination of two factors: the expiration of patents on block-
buster drugs (also known as the patent cliff) alongside the
subsequent entry of lower priced generics, and the move
in a number of Canadian provinces to lower generic prices
[7]. The impact of such provincial policy changes is seen
through Ontario’s expenditure on atorvastatin (Lipitor) –
a drug used to treat high cholesterol. In 2009–10, prior to
patent expiration, this medication cost Ontario $316 mil-
lion [8]. Once Lipitor’s patent expired and generics were
available, the cost for atorvastatin dropped in 2010–11
to $133 million [9], thereby saving Ontario $183 million.
These savings will increase as provinces aggressively lower
the price that they pay for generics as Ontario, British
Columbia and Alberta, among other provinces, have done
within the past few years [10].
This paper discusses the three main provisions in CETA
that relate to patented drugs and explains how they will
lead to increased drugs costs.Discussion
Impact of CETA’s intellectual property rights provisions
By understanding Canada’s current pharmaceutical re-
gime, we can better explore the potential impact that will
be felt through CETA—specifically its intellectual property
rights provisions (IPRs). There are three provisions affect-
ing IPRs in CETA that pose a serious threat to the an-
ticipated savings from generic drugs like those seen in
Ontario: patent term restoration, a consolidation of data
protection, and a right of appeal under the Notice of
Compliance (NOC) regulations. The following section ex-
plores the rationale behind each of these provisions and
explains how their implementation will negatively impact
Canada’s capacity to control drug costs.
Patent term restoration
Under the terms of the World Trade Organization’s
1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS), patents on pharmaceuti-
cals – and all other goods – run for 20 years from the
time that the patent application is filed. CETA will now
allow for what is called a “sui generis protection” (also
called “patent term restoration”) that can provide up to
two additional years of patent protection. The aim of pa-
tent term restoration is to compensate companies for
the time lost between when the patent application is
filed and when the drug is eventually approved. The
period of the patent term restoration will be calculated
by taking the time between when the patent was applied
for and when the product was marketed and subtracting
5 years. As long as the result is 2 years or less, that
additional time will be added to the length of the patent.
It seems that this additional time will be available even if
the company/patentee is responsible for any delays in
the approval process [11]. According to Rx & D, the asso-
ciation representing the Canadian brand-name drug com-
panies, “Canada remains the only developed nation that
provides no form of compensation to innovative pharma-
ceutical companies for regulatory approval delays” [12].
The rationale in support of patent term-restoration is
that without such a change, Canada has an incentive to
slow down the approval process. A comparative analysis
by a multinational law firm regularly consulting for the
brand-name pharmaceutical industry, justifies patent term
restoration by claiming that Canadian drug approval times
are 152 days slower than those in the EU (433 versus
281 days). The report claims that slower drug approval
means that drugs launched in Canada may have far less
time remaining from the 20-year patent term com-
pared to drugs launched in the EU [13]. The Canadian
Generic Pharmaceutical Association commissioned a re-
sponse to this comparative analysis. In the response, Hollis
and Grootendorst find the data used in the compara-
tive analysis problematic in two key elements. “First,
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[European Medicines Agency] report clearly states that
approval takes an additional 79 days beyond the assess-
ment period... Compounding this error, almost half of the
EMA approvals were for ‘generic or hybrid medicines and
informed consent applications’ which are obviously very
different in nature from the New Drug Submissions in the
Canadian data” [14]. In addition, the longer approval time
in Canada is the result of four specific drugs where the ini-
tial regulatory submission from the company was deemed
deficient or non-compliant with Health Canada’s filing re-
quirements and more information was requested from the
manufacturer. There was a prolonged delay before drug
companies finally submitted the required information,
thereby artificially inflating the average difference between
Canada and the EU. When these four drugs were ex-
cluded from the calculations, Canadian approval times
for the remaining drugs are on average 67 days less
than in Europe [14].
Finally, there is an additional serious error in the Rx &
D sponsored analysis. The report only compares approval
times for 22 drugs. When using a larger sample of drugs
approved by either the EMA or Health Canada between
2001 and 2010, the median approval time in Europe was
366 days (interquartile range, 310 to 447) and 393 days
(interquartile range, 310 to 603) at Health Canada, for a
difference of 27 days instead of 152. Finally, when con-
sidering drugs approved by both the European Medicines
Agency and Health Canada, that difference drops to just
10 days [15].Data protection
In addition to patent term restoration, another provision
of CETA that will put pressure on drug costs pertains to
the data protection provisions of CETA. The “data” in
this term refers to the safety and efficacy information
that brand-name companies generate through the clin-
ical trials they conduct in order to get drugs approved.
Typically generic companies rely on this data when they
submit applications to get products approved. Both the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the TRIPS agreement specify that data should be pro-
tected for five years although even that five-year period
is subject to interpretation. Article 39.3 in TRIPS only
requires countries to protect against “unfair commercial
use” of marketing approval data but gives countries con-
siderable discretion to define “unfair” in the context of
their own national laws and culture. “Countries can meet
their obligations to protect against “unfair commercial
use” under Article 39.3 by barring “dishonest” uses of test
data. Countries are not obligated under Article 39.3 to
confer exclusive rights on the originator of marketing ap-
proval data [16].In 2006, Canada extended data protection to eight
years of market exclusivity with an additional six months
if companies have studied the drug in a pediatric popula-
tion. Generic companies are not allowed to make use of
the brand-name companies’ data in their applications for
a minimum of six years [17]. Although CETA will not
extend data protection, Canada has “agreed to lock in
the current Canadian practice of providing eight years of
market exclusivity” [18], making it virtually impossible
for any future government to shorten the period.
Moreover, up until CETA, data protection was only
granted to new chemical entities, i.e., drugs that have
never been sold in any form in Canada. During the ne-
gotiations, the EU was demanding that improved data
protection be granted for any pharmaceutical product
rather than just new chemical entities. Limited informa-
tion about the contents of CETA makes it unclear if the
range of products available for eight years of data pro-
tection will be expanded to include products represent-
ing minor changes to an existing drug [11]. If the EU’s
demand has been accepted, the net effect would be to ef-
fectively offer financial incentives for companies to en-
gage in minor molecular manipulation and produce
drugs that offer no new therapeutic advances.
Right of appeal
The final CETA provision regarding IPR that will put
pressure on drug costs by delaying the appearance of ge-
nerics, is the right of appeal. A Notice of Compliance
(NOC) is the term Health Canada uses when it certifies
that a drug manufacturer has met Health Canada's regu-
latory requirements for the safety, efficacy and quality of
a product. In 1993, the federal government introduced
the NOC linkage regulations as part of the legislation
that abolished compulsory licensing to import generic
drugs into Canada. Under the linkage regulations Health
Canada is prevented from issuing an authorization for
market entry for a generic until the generic company
can show that all of the relevant patents on the brand
name product have expired. As a result, when the gen-
eric company submits its application to get a product
approved it also sends a Notice of Allegation (NOA) to
the patent holder claiming that no patents are being in-
fringed. The patent holder then has 45 days in which to
initiate an application in the Federal Court of Canada
seeking an order to prohibit Health Canada from issuing
a NOC to the generic manufacturer for a period of up to
24 (originally 30) months. At that point, the matter usu-
ally proceeds to a court hearing. The stay expires either
at the end of the 24 months, when the disputed patent
expires or when the court case is decided, whichever
comes first [19].
The argument put forward by the brand-name indus-
try has been that if the generic company wins the court
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NOC has been issued any appeal filed by the patentee
becomes moot [20]. The patentee is thus left with no al-
ternative but to start another proceeding (an action for
patent infringement) once the generic has entered the
market. CETA will now allow brand-name companies
the right to appeal decisions made under the NOC link-
age regulations. However, the generic companies have
received written assurances from the Government of
Canada that its implementation of the “Right of Appeal”
treaty commitment will also address excessive and dupli-
cative litigation by ending the practice of dual litigation.
Dual litigation means that even if brand-name compan-
ies lose under the NOC linkage regulations, they can
launch a separate case under Canada’s general patent
law. It is this ability to launch a second court case that
the federal government has pledged to end. Although
this will work to the advantage of the generic companies
there will still potentially be an additional delay to the
marketing of generic drugs.
Since the EU does not use patent linkage and CETA
does not require it to do so, this Right of Appeal pro-
vision only applies to Canada. The EU currently allows
interlocutory injunctions that prevent a generic from
launching until the litigation is complete or the parties
have settled. The ease of obtaining such injunctions var-
ies according to each national jurisdiction and it has
been argued that these injunctions are the equivalent of
Canada’s NOC regulations [21]. Patent linkage systems,
however, automatically deliver the equivalent of an in-
junction without prior analysis of evidence that a patent
is being infringed [22]. In fact, the European Commission
prohibits EU member countries from introducing patent
linkage provisions because they delay the entry of ge-
nerics. Italy was reprimanded in 2012 for trying to intro-
duce such a system and was asked to eliminate it [23]. It is
thus ironic that under CETA, rather than Canada eli-
minating its patent linkage system, it will be forced to
strengthen it by providing a right of appeal that will create
further delays for the entry of generics. In practice, this
means that under CETA there could be a further delay of
6–18 months before generics appear, as the appeal makes
its way through the court system [11].
Financial implications of CETA
Although it is impossible to be sure what the final finan-
cial implications of CETA will be once its IPR provisions
fully come into effect, Grootendorst and Hollis used the
sample of the 15 drugs for which a generic appeared on
the Canadian market in 2010 to provide an estimate of
what would have been the consequences if all of CETA’s
provisions were fully implemented in 2010. The analysis
of the impact of the different provisions was performed
by Gilbert’s LLP, a law firm specializing in patentlitigation. The result of the analysis, undertaken before
the CETA negotiations were completed, was that CETA
would delay the entry of generics by 3.46 years on aver-
age and that the annual loss for every additional year of
entry delay was $811 million, leading to an additional
cost of $2.8 billion per year [11].
Internal documents from the federal government also
estimated that the additional costs for patented drugs
could be up to $2 billion [24], but the methodology
used to arrive at this estimate is not known and Trade
Minister Ed Fast has refused to release these government
documents [25].
The model used by Hollis and Grootendorst included
delays due to the right of appeal under NOC regulations,
extension of data exclusivity, and implementation of a
patent term restoration of a maximum of five years (plus
an additional six months when pediatric trials were con-
ducted). We have revised their calculations to adjust
them for the actual clauses found in CETA, i.e., right of
appeal under NOC regulations and patent term restor-
ation of a maximum two years. If we use the same sam-
ple of 15 drugs, and if we assume that data exclusivity is
only extended to innovative drugs, we observe that if
CETA was fully implemented in 2010 (the reference year
for the Hollis and Grootendorst analysis), it would have
increased the average market exclusivity for patented
drugs by 358.4 days, or 0.98 years, which would bring an
additional yearly cost of $795 million, or 6.2% of the
total annual cost of patented drugs, which was $12.8 bil-
lion for that year [2]. If CETA extends data exclusivity to
non-innovative drugs, the average delay would increase
by 741 days, or 2.03 years, which represents an add-
itional yearly cost of $1,645 million, or 12.9% of total
costs of patented drugs. [For the details of the cal-
culations, see Additional file 1: Table S1 and S2] While
we believe that our update of the calculations done by
Grootendorst and Hollis represents a reasonable esti-
mate of the effects of the CETA provisions on Canadian
drug expenditures we acknowledge that their figures,
based on the analysis performed by the law firm Gilbert’s
LLP, have not been verified by any individuals independ-
ent of both the generic and brand-name industries.
The additional costs cited above assume that CETA’s
provisions are applied to drugs currently on the market.
As such they are only approximations of what the even-
tual costs will be since patent term restoration will only
apply to drugs approved after CETA is ratified. Generic
equivalents for these drugs will only start to appear
around 2023 [26] and the actual additional costs will de-
pend on how many drugs receive patent term restoration
and what their sales are. In addition, overall increases in
provincial costs could be mitigated if the provincial plans
impose price restrictions on patented medications, or im-
plement stricter conditions for listing these products on
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occur they will not impact on the costs for people with
private insurance or who pay out of pocket.
The federal government has announced that it will com-
pensate provinces for the rise in drug costs for their public
drug plans [27]. If this proves to be the case, then instead
of Canadian taxpayers paying the additional costs for pre-
scription drugs at the provincial level they will simply pay
at the federal level. Importantly, people paying out of
pocket for their drugs, or through private insurance, will
not benefit from this compensation. Estimates are that
13% of the Canadian population is either uninsured or
underinsured for prescription drug costs [28] and that
cost-related nonadherence is 35% among people with low
income and no insurance [29]. People with no drug cover-
age and paying out of pocket are usually people with mini-
mum wage jobs [28] and are often the least able to absorb
increases in prices. No compensation will be given for ei-
ther co-payments or deductibles paid out-of-pocket by in-
sured patients covered by a public drug plan. Therefore,
whatever compensatory measures the federal government
is committing to, in order to help provinces offset the pre-
dicted cost increases, will not help those who will be the
most impacted by these increases.
Conclusion
If drug costs continue to grow, there are limited options
for cost containment and most of them would involve
greater hardship for people who need the medications:
restrict the choice of medicines that the provinces offer
to their citizens; place more of the burden of costs on
individuals, typically the elderly and the sick; or take
money out of other places in the health system, thereby
threatening the viability of Canada’s single payer system.
Canadians should not have to accept any of these choices.
Instead, if the growth in costs is inevitable then we could
consider raising taxes. While we see that as a viable option
it is highly unlikely to be taken up by provincial and fe-
deral governments. Finally, measures could be taken to
ensure that costs are controlled. One of those measures is
rejecting the parts of CETA that will significantly impact
the ability of Canadians to afford quality health care.
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